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PROOF OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS IN
OKLAHOMA: THE PRIMA FACIE
STANDARD
Hunt Lee Charach*
I. INTRODUCTION
An overwhelming majority of states, including Oklahoma, have en-
acted criminal recidivism statutes which impose greater punishments on
repeat offenders. Under such statutes, a critical element of proof is the
defendant's prior conviction. The history, development, and application
of the rules for proving prior convictions under Oklahoma's habitual of-
fender statutes show that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has
gradually eased the burden of establishing the existence of a prior convic-
tion. The current practice in Oklahoma which permits proof of prior
convictions through uncorroborated documentary evidence, in effect,
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove the habitual of-
fender charge.
II. HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF OKLAHOMA'S
RECIDIVISM STATUTES
Oklahoma has maintained a general "habitual offender" provision in
its statutes since 1887.1 Prior to 1936, however, application of the statute
* Law Clerk to the Honorable James M. Sprouse, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit; B.A., Concord College; J.D., University of Tulsa. The opinions expressed in this
article are the author's and do not represent the opinions of the Honorable James M. Sprouse.
1. DAK. CoMP. LAWS §§ 6946, 6948 (1887). In 1890, the territorial habitual offender laws
were codified in the Oklahoma Statutes. OKLA. STAT. ch. 25, art. 59, §§ 12, 14 (1890). These origi-
nal provisions roughly distinguished prior felony convictions from prior "misdemeanor" convic-
tions, with more stringent sentence enhancements imposed on habitual felons. The dispositive factor
determining which provision was to be applied was the maximum prison sentence which could be
imposed for the prior crime. A potential five-year sentence for the prior conviction constituted the
dividing point. Interestingly, if the prior conviction was for petit larceny, the 1890 statute directed
the court to apply the more stringent provision, notwithstanding that the maximum sentence on the
larceny crime may have been less than five years. A similar distinction for prior petit larceny convic-
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in reported cases was largely non-existent.2 The foundational evidentiary
and procedural rules concerning proof of prior conviction developed in
prosecutions under a 1911 statute3 which provided enhanced penalties
for repeat violations of Oklahoma's liquor laws.4
tions has survived in the modem provisions. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 52(3) (1981); Simmons v.
State, 549 P.2d 111 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
The current habitual offender statute appears at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 51 (West Supp.
1985). Subsection (B) of the present statute was substantially rewritten after Thigpen v. State, 571
P.2d 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977), which declared unconstitutional the former version of the sub-
section. Prior to Thigpen, the statute was capable of an interpretation which would impose signifi-
cantly greater sentences on second offenders than on third offenders. Because this result could not
possibly accord with legislative intent, the court found the subsection void for vagueness. However,
it is unclear whether the holding was based on the United States Constitution or the Oklahoma
Constitution. Id. at 471; see also Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 350 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
2. Judicial reference to the statute was first made in Johnston v. State, 46 Okla. Crim. 431, 287
P. 1068 (1930). The case essentially involved a prosecution under the habitual offender provision of
the alcohol prohibition laws. See infra note 3 and accompanying text. Johnston is notable, however,
for the court uttered an important statement concerning a defendant's rights in a habitual offender
prosecution.
When the defendant pleaded 'not guilty,' he put in issue ... the fact of the alleged former
conviction. To sustain a conviction in this case, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . [that the defendant] had been convicted . . . as alleged. Defendant was not
required to prove his innocence or to offer any testimony. He had the constitutional right
to a trial by jury, and to have the charge against him submitted to the jury upon the
question of his guilt of the offense for which he was on trial, which included the fact of a
prior conviction and of his identity with the person so convicted. The court could not take
judicial notice of the former conviction, and, although proven by the record and undis-
puted by defendant, could not invade the province of the jury and instruct them that this
essential allegation of fact was true; that is, the court could not take any of these essential
facts from the jury and submit the others, and, when he attempted to do so, he in effect
denied defendant a trial by jury.
Id. at 434, 287 P. at 1069. See also Bassett v. State, 42 Okla. Crim. 126, 274 P. 893 (1929).
Although not recorded as such, the decision in Johnston can be read as overruling an earlier
decision under the same statute. In Files v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 363, 182 P. 911 (1919), the defend-
ant demurred to the documentary evidence introduced as proof of his former conviction on the
grounds that the state submitted no independent evidence proving that he was the same person as
the "Files" whose name appeared on the court records in the earlier cases. The court held that
"proof of his identity was not necessary. Defendant was being prosecuted as Bert Files, and if he
was not the same person referred to in the records showing the former conviction of Bert Files, the
burden was upon him to show such fact." Id. at 367, 182 P. at 912. The Files decision is the earliest
recorded utterance in Oklahoma in support of the (present) view that documentary evidence of prior
convictions bearing the name of the defendant, standing alone, is primafacie proof of his identity as
a repeat offender in prosecutions under habitual offender statutes. The quoted section from Files
bears a great resemblance to judicial utterances on the subject which appear in many recent cases.
3. Intoxicating Liquors-Prohibition Enforcement Act, ch. 70, §§ 16, 18, 1911 Okla. Sess.
Laws 154, 165-66, repealed by Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, ch. 1, § 1, 1959 Okla.
Sess. Laws 141. An exhaustive history of pre-1950 legislative amendments and judicial interpreta-
tions of the statute is provided in Harrigill v. State, 90 Okla. Crim. 347, 350-54, 214 P.2d 263, 266-70
(1950). For a general discussion of the history of Oklahoma's liquor laws see Bandy, Intoxicating
Liquors in Oklahoma, reprinted in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, at I (West 1981).
4. These decisions repeatedly refer to the habitual offender provision of the liquor laws as
"The Habitual Criminal Act," see, eg., Fowler v. State, 14 Okla. Crim. 316, 317, 170 P. 917, 918
(1918); this denotation should not be confused with the general habitual offender statute which is the
subject of this study.
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A. The Liquor Cases
Beginning in 1917 with the case of Tucker v. State,5 the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals ("the court") set forth what was to become a
procession of evidentiary and procedural requirements necessary to sup-
port a conviction under the habitual offender provision of the alcohol
prohibition laws. The Tucker court ruled that, in order to sustain a con-
viction, the charging instrument must clearly aver that the principal of-
fense charged is in fact a second or subsequent violation of the liquor
laws.' Furthermore, the information or indictment must also show that
the defendant was convicted in a court that possessed jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the person.7
One year later in Fowler v. State,8 the court clarified the Tucker
standard by reversing the defendant's conviction because the charging
instrument did not properly allege the previous conviction. Although the
document averred that Fowler had entered a plea of guilty to the prior
offense, the court observed that "a plea of guilty is not a conviction," 9
therefore, the information was insufficient to charge the defendant with a
felony under the habitual offender provision. The absence of the requi-
site factual averment deprived the trial court of jurisdiction under the
statute, which could not be cured by any "intendment, inference or im-
plication."1 Without the necessary particularity in the pleadings, any
evidence offered to prove the defendant's prior conviction was deemed
inadmissible. Thus, even if a pleading sufficiently alleged the defendant's
prior conviction, documentary evidence that established only a previous
5. 14 Okla. Crim. 54, 167 P. 637 (1917). It should be noted that the dicta in the Tucker case
has been overruled regarding pardoned offenses. See supra note 7.
6. The habitual offender provision of the liquor laws was only applicable when the prior and
principal offenses were violations of the liquor laws. But cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 51 (West
Supp. 1985) (general habitual offender statute applicable to persons previously convicted of any
offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary).
7. Tucker, 14 Okla. Crim. at 55, 167 P. at 638. The court also ruled the provision inapplicable
to persons who had been pardoned of the prior offense by the Governor. Id. at 57, 167 P. at 640. The
existence of a pardon was an affirmative defense. Id The exemption for pardoned offenses was later
distinguished as dicta in Newton v. State, 56 Okla. Crim. 391, 394, 40 P.2d 688, 691 (1935), a
prosecution brought under the general habitual offender statute. The exemption for pardoned of.
fenses was expressly overruled in Scott v. Raines, 373 P.2d 267, 270 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962).
8. 14 Okla. Crim. 316, 170 P. 917 (1918).
9. Id. at 318, 170 P. at 918.
10. Id.; accord Wright v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 458, 184 P. 158 (1919). Although the court
later adopted more flexible pleading rules, Littlejohn v. State, 32 Okla. Crim. 401, 241 P. 210 (1925),
the jurisdictional requirement that the defendant's prior conviction must be affirmatively alleged in
the charging instrument for the principal offense has survived to date. See Roberson v. State, 362
P.2d 1115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961). The allegation of previous conviction is necessary to bring a
case within the habitual offender provisions because it is not a distinct charge of the principal offense,
but goes to punishment only. Bilbrey v. State, 444 P.2d 225 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968).
1986]
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jury verdict against the defendant or a guilty plea entered by him, absent
additional evidence of a judgment and sentence imposed, would be inade-
quate to sustain the defendant's conviction under the liquor law habitual
offender statute.
Two cases typical of the era and representative of the application of
the liquor law habitual offender statute are Martin v. State 11 and Han-
cock v. State. 12 The facts presented in both cases are nearly identical.
Martin and Hancock were convicted at trial of transporting intoxicating
liquor. Their sentences were enhanced because both had allegedly been
convicted of prior alcohol related offenses. In Martin, the state at-
tempted to prove the defendant's prior conviction through an ambiguous
court record which did not clearly evidence that Martin, as opposed to a
co-defendant, had formerly been convicted of an offense. Relying on an
earlier case, Browder v. State,13 in which the Attorney General on appeal
admitted that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the de-
fendant's conviction of a prior crime, the court found that Martin's for-
mer conviction was inadequately proved and reversed the trial court
judgment against him. 4 As proof of former conviction in Hancock, the
state submitted documentary evidence which showed that one "L. J.
Hancock" was previously charged with an alcohol related offense and an
appearance docket entry which noted that "the defendant" had pleaded
guilty to the charge and received a jail sentence and fine. The prosecu-
tion also submitted court records which indicated that one "J. L. Han-
cock" had paid the fine in the case. On appeal, the court found the
documentary evidence insufficient to prove that the present defendant, J.
L. Hancock, was the same person who suffered conviction in the earlier
case. 1
5
Although both of these cases resulted in reversal of the defendant's
convictions, in neither did the court set forth evidentiary guidelines for
proving a defendant's prior convictions in a prosecution under a recidi-
vist statute. Aside from the necessary pleading of particularities, the
court's pronouncements up to this point provided little guidance in deter-
mining the quantum of evidence of prior conviction necessary to support
sentence enhancement. The trend of reversals on both procedural and
11. 30 Okla. Crim. 49, 234 P. 795 (1925).
12. 33 Okla. Crim. 47, 241 P. 1108 (1925).
13. 15 Okla. Crim. 287, 176 P. 96 (1918), aff'd, 16 Okla. Crim. 41, 180 P. 570 (1919).
14. Martin, 30 Okla. Crim. at 50, 234 P. at 796.
15. Hancock, 33 Okla. Crim at 48, 241 P. at 1109. It is a curious fact that the evidence of prior
conviction held insufficient in Hancock might well be deemed adequate today. See infra note 51 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 22:29
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substantive grounds, however, indicated the court's pronounced concern
that the statute be implemented in a guarded manner.
In Rogers v. State,16 the court, for the first time, affirmatively enu-
merated the specific documentary proofs necessary to establish the exis-
tence of a prior conviction. The court held that "the showing of a former
conviction should be supported by proof of the indictment or informa-
tion, a copy of the minutes, showing the plea or demurrer, the verdict of
the jury, if any, and the final judgment on the verdict or plea."' 17 The
Rogers court then carved out an exception to the above requirements
applicable to prior offenses which had been affirmed on appeal.'" The
16. 34 Okla. Crim. 15, 244 P. 461 (1926).
17. Id. at 17-18, 244 P. at 462. The court declared that it was relying on evidentiary proofs
which were "inferentially" set forth in Browder v. State, 15 Okla. Crim. 287, 176 P. 96 (1918), aff'd,
16 Okla. Crim. 41, 180 P. 570 (1919). Rogers, 34 Okla. Crim. at 17, 244 P. at 462.
In 1938, during the waning years of enforcement of the liquor law recidivist provision, the court
decided Morse v. State, 63 Okla. Crim. 445, 77 P.2d 757 (1938), wherein it issued a slightly different
guideline for proving the defendant's former conviction.
The best method of proving a prior conviction is by offering in evidence the indictment or
information and the judgment of conviction, and after these instruments are introduced
proof should be offered to show that the case has not been appealed, or, if appealed, that
final disposition has been made of the same.
Id. at 456, 77 P.2d at 762.
The court, citing Halbert v. State, 18 Okla. Crim. 378, 380, 195 P. 504, 506 (1921), again noted
that a mere entry on an appearance docket which references the defendant's prior conviction will not
satisfy the state's burden of proof. Morse, 63 Okla. Crim. at 455-56, 77 P.2d at 762. Halbert
presented a double jeopardy issue in which the defendant asserted that a prior conviction for assault
and battery arising out of the same incident precluded a subsequent prosecution for attempted rape.
To establish his former conviction, the prosecution introduced an appearance docket which noted
the defendant's guilty plea to the charge. Suspecting that the defendant collusively procured the
prior conviction to avoid prosecution on the more serious rape charge, the court denied his double
jeopardy claim because, inter alia, the appearance docket was not the "best evidence" of the prior
conviction and the alleged identity between the fats underlying it and the present charge. Halbert,
18 Okla. Crim. at 384-85, 195 P. at 506-07.
The quoted statement from Morse has only historical value because it was not the holding in the
case. Many years later, however, the court reactivated nearly identical proof requirements in prose-
cutions under the general habitual offender provisions. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying
text. However, two modem differences are noteworthy. First, the information (or other charging
instrument) of the prior offense is not admissible into evidence because it proves only the fact that a
charge was filed, not the existence of a conviction. Moreover, charging instruments tend to set forth
sordid details of the crime which are prejudicial to the defendant and entirely irrelevant to the fact of
conviction. See Browning v. State, 648 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Wade v. State, 624
P.2d 86, 92 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); Jones v. State, 456 P.2d 613, 616 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
Second, the court has recently held that, in the absence of proof that the prior conviction has not
been appealed or affirmed on appeal, proof that the trial court notified the defendant of his right to
appeal coupled with a lengthy span of time from the date judgment and sentence was entered at trial,
will raise a presumption that the prior conviction is final. See Bickerstaffv. State, 669 P.2d 778, 780
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983). The defendant now has the burden of going forward with evidence to show
that the prior conviction relied on by the prosecution is not final. In Bickerstaff, the court also held
that the defendant bears the burden of establishing, as an affirmative defense, that the prior felony
offenses relied on by the prosecution did not arise out of a single criminal transaction. Id.
18. Rogers, 34 Okla. Crim. at 16, 244 P. at 462.
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exception allowed the introduction of documentary evidence of a judg-
ment and sentence entered against the defendant at trial to be substituted
with an opinion and judgment of the court (Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals) affirming the prior conviction. In retrospect, the Rogers deci-
sion reaffirms the court's preoccupation with pleading rules and the in-
clusion of minute details in court documents.
B. The Early Cases Under Oklahoma's Habitual Offender Statute
Section 51
Beginning in the mid-1930's, prosecutorial use and misuse of
Oklahoma's general habitual offender statutes became well-documented
in the recorded opinions of the court.19 As a result of the many cases
appealed, the court promulgated a panoply of rules governing the imple-
mentation of the statutes. Most of the doctrines announced, although
vital to the proper administration of the provisions, are beyond the scope
of this study,20 which is limited to the proofs and procedures necessary to
establish the accused's prior convictions at trial.
As noted above, the earliest decisions applying section 51 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, the most often used general habitual offender statute,
adopted the proof requirements of former conviction as set forth in the
19. Perhaps due to the pressures of the depression era, many of the early prosecutions involved
repeat petit larceny offenses. See, eg., Exparte Wray, 61 Okla. Crim. 162, 66 P.2d 965 (1937); Ex
parte Weaver, 60 Okla. Crim. 290, 64 P.2d 925 (1937); Exparte Bailey, 60 Okla. Crim. 278, 64 P.2d
278 (1936).
In all three of the cited cases, the court granted the petitioners' applications for writs of habeas
corpus upon finding that the trial courts erred in construing the habitual offender statute as creating
a new substantive offense of "habitual criminal." The court, relying on extra-jurisdictional prece-
dent, declared that habitual criminality is a state of being and not a crime in itself. Therefore, the
habitual offender provisions do not create or define a new or independent offense, but rather, de-
scribe circumstances wherein one found guilty of a specific crime may be more severely penalized
because of previous convictions. See Bailey, 60 Okla. Crim. at 282-83, 64 P.2d at 280. In this regard,
the modem interpretation of the statutes has not changed. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 549 P.2d 111,
116-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
20. Treatment of the established rules and procedures applicable to the habitual offender provi-
sions, and the challenges thereto, has been surprisingly sparse in Oklahoma's scholarly periodicals.
Two short comments, touching upon discrete applications of the statutes, appear in the Oklahoma
Law Review. See Criminal Law: Use of Prior Convictions as Evidence, 32 OKLA. L. Rov. 246
(1979); Comment, Criminal Law: Necessity of Preliminary Hearing for Charge of Habitual Crimi-
nal, 11 OKLA. L. REv. 76 (1958). For general, cross-jurisdictional commentary on habitual offender
statutes, see Comment, Recidivist Procedures: Prejudice and Due Process, 53 CORNELL L. Q. 337
(1968); Comment, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 332 (1965); Note, The Pleading and
Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Criminal Prosecutions, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1958). For a
short, practical article evaluating various defensive challenges to prior conviction evidence, see Muel-
ler, Attacking Prior Convictions in Habitual Criminal Cases: Avoiding the Third Strike, II COLO.
LAW. 1225 (1982).
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case law under the alcohol prohibition recidivist statute."' The court rec-
ognized no evidentiary or procedural distinctions between the application
of the two statutes, despite their very diverse natures.2" In these cases,
the defendant's prior conviction, as alleged in the charging instrument,
was proved through documentary evidence 3 during the prosecution's
case in chief on the principal offense.24
A perceptible current of change enveloped the court's opinions in
the 1940's and 1950's. Quite unobtrusively, the court seemed to shift its
focus away from matters of pleading and the contents of documentary
evidence toward the more vital concern of accurately establishing the de-
fendant's identity as being one and the same with the person whose name
appeared in the court records of the prior conviction. A preliminary ex-
ample is Bird v. State," wherein the court, without reference to pertinent
21. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Compare, e.g., Pitzer v. State, 69 Okla. Crim. 363,
368-69, 103 P. 2d 109, 111-12 (1940) with Spann v. State, 69 Okla. Crim 369, 373, 103 P.2d 389, 393
(1940). See also Lee v. State, 67 Okla. Crim. 283, 288, 94 P.2d 5, 7 (1939) (documentary evidence
sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under habitual offender statute, fact that defendant ad-
mitted prior conviction held merely cumulative).
Although not dispositive of the case, the Spann court, in a syllabus preceding the opinion,
indicated that, in addition to documentary evidence, "an identification of the defendant as being the
party against whom the [prior] judgment was rendered" was a necessary element of proof of prior
conviction. Spann, 69 Okla. Crim. at 370, 103 P. 2d at 390. In the body of the opinion, however, the
court approvingly cited Files v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 363, 182 P. 911 (1919) for establishing the
procedure the state must follow to prove the fact of the defendant's previous conviction. In Files, the
court held that the defendant bears the burden of "proving" his lack of identity with the person
whose name appears on the court records introduced as proof of his prior conviction. See supra note
2. The facts of Spann, however, render the conflicting nature of the court's pronouncements moot;
on cross-examination Spann admitted his former conviction. Spann, 69 Okla. Crim. at 377-78, 103
P.2d at 393.
22. For example, penalties under the general statute were much more severe than penalties
under its liquor law counterpart. Further, as previously observed, the general statute was applicable
in cases where the defendant formerly had been convicted of any crime punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary (or petit larceny), whereas the liquor law statute was confined to prior convictions
under the prohibition laws. See supra note 6.
23. An argument can be made that documentary proof of prior conviction, absent independent
identification evidence, was more justifiable under the liquor law statute than under the general
statute. Many of the prohibition laws proscribed conduct malum prohibitum. The ineffectiveness of
these laws in curbing behavior is as well-documented by the history of the prohibition era as are
current provisions proscribing such crimes as public drunkenness or possession of marijuana. Thus,
it was reasonable to believe that repeat offenses were likely to occur. The same assumption does not
necessarily arise under statutes proscribing acts malum in se. Credibility is lent to this argument by
the sheer number of repeat prosecutions under the liquor laws, as compared to other crimes falling
within the general statute, evidenced by the recorded opinions of the court between 1911 and 1940.
24. This procedure was later changed by the court. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
The prejudicial effect of introducing the defendant's criminal past to the jury during the case in chief
on the principal offense is readily imaginable, particularly when the accused has invoked his right
not to testify. For a particularly egregious application of the old procedure, see Carr v. State, 91
Okla. Crim. 94, 99, 216 P.2d 333, 336 (prosecution introduced evidence of numerous prior convic-
tions before offering any evidence related to principal charge), cert denied, 340 U.S. 840 (1950).
25. 85 Okla. Crim. 313, 188 P.2d 242 (1947).
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citation, affirmed the defendant's conviction as a second offender on
grounds that:
[T]he introduction in evidence of the judgment, sentence and commit-
ment of former conviction .... with the identification by the sheriff
.... as to the defendant being the identical person named in said judg-
ment and sentence, was sufficient in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
the person so charged and convicted ....
In response to the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of evi-
dence connecting him with the prior conviction, this holding clearly im-
ports the court's view that the identification of the defendant, apart from
court records bearing his name, is an essential element of proof necessary
to sustain conviction on appeal.27
In the next important case, Stroud v. State, 8 the court appeared to
retreat from the direct identification requirement established in the Bird
decision. In Stroud, the defendant was charged with robbery after for-
mer conviction of a felony. As proof of the former conviction, the trial
court admitted documentary evidence establishing that a person bearing
the defendant's name had been convicted of felonies in Oklahoma. Addi-
tionally, a police officer testified that the defendant was the same "James
D. Stroud" whose name appeared in the court records of the prior con-
viction. On cross-examination, however, the officer admitted that his
identification was based on photographs of the defendant he had seen in
police department records of the prior offenses and that he had no per-
sonal knowledge that the defendant was convicted and imprisoned on
those charges. Sustaining the defendant's objection to the officer's testi-
mony, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard all evidence of the
defendant's prior convictions because no direct identification evidence
was offered by a witness with personal knowledge of the fact. The jury
then convicted the defendant of the principal offense. On appeal, the
defendant claimed prejudicial error in the trial court's admission of the
court records pertaining to his prior convictions. Denying the claim, the
court held that the trial judge committed error in favor of the defendant
by excluding the habitual offender charge.29 Relying on Files v. State,30
26. Id. at 319, 188 P.2d at 245 (emphasis added). The court purported to rely on casesthat
contained no independent identification requirement.
27. Research indicates that Bird is the first case in which the court premised an actual holding
on an independent identification requirement.
28. 95 Okla. Crim. 113, 240 P.2d 1125 (1952).
29. Id. at 116, 240 P.2d at 1128.
30. 16 Okla. Crim. 363, 364, 182 P. 911, 912 (1919). Fora discussion of the Files decision, see
supra note 2.
[Vol. 22:29
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the court declared that circumstantial proof of prior convictions suffices
to take the habitual offender charge to the jury. The court observed that,
although direct identification is the best method of proof of prior
conviction:
[W]here the date set forth in the information, judgment, and sentence,
and other exhibits introduced in connection with the former convic-
tions show the person to have the identical name of the accused, and
that such convictions were sustained in the county where accused re-
sided, and that, as shown here by the testimony of the police officer,
that during the period of time during which the accused was allegedly
in the penitentiary that he was absent from his usual place of residence
in his home county, the same makes out a prima facie case, and, in the
absence of any rebutting evidence, is sufficient to require such issue to
be submitted to the jury.3 1
The holding in Stroud, despite its reliance on Files, did not necessar-
ily signal a return to the old documentary evidence standard. Clearly, the
court required "something more" than court records to satisfy the prose-
cution's prima facie case. Stroud simply announced that the incremental
proofs of the defendant's identity may be established through circum-
stantial evidence which tends to show that the defendant was in fact con-
victed of a prior offense.32 Seen in this light, Stroud comports with the
holding of Bird and later cases discussed below.
In Tice v. State,33 the court instructed that subsequent to the intro-
duction of court records evidencing a prior conviction, "Proof of the fact
should then be made that the defendant, in the case on trial, is one and
the same person as the defendant in the prior conviction relied upon to
establish the offense of a second or subsequent conviction." 34Although
the defendant in Tice did not challenge his trial court identification on
appeal,35 the incremental proof of identity made at trial was referred to
31. Stroud, 95 Okla. Crim. at 116, 240 P.2d at 1128.
32. Evidence that the prior conviction was sustained in the county where the accused resided
combined with testimony that the accused was absent therefrom during the period of incarceration
for the sentence imposed, should stand as a valuable circumstantial identity link in habitual offender
prosecutions. In many cases, however, these elements of proof may be more difficult (or even impos-
sible) to obtain than direct identification evidence.
33. 283 P.2d 872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955).
34. Id. at 874.
35. Id. Tice asserted that, inter alia, inadequate evidence was offered to prove that the Texas
judgment and sentence, relied on to enhance his sentence on the principal offense, was a final judg-
ment. The court determined that the finality of a former conviction may be established through the
introduction of a judgment sentence, indictment, and a prison commitment entered thereupon. It is
interesting to note that the court relied solely on documentary evidence as proof of the finality of the
defendant's prior conviction; whereas, when discussing the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the
conviction as a whole, the court referred to the incremental evidence connecting the present defend-
ant with the former conviction. Id at 874-5.
1986]
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in the court's opinion. 36 A close reading of the decision indicates that the
court found it essential to any challenge to a conviction under the habit-
ual offender provisions that some proof, beyond mere documentation,
was offered to connect the defendant with the prior offenses. 37 Interest-
ingly, the rule of Tice and its immediate progeny Woods v. State38 gave
rise to a parallel federal doctrine in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit.39 Although the requirement of independent sub-
36. The court observed that the defendant's father testified at trial that he had personal knowl-
edge of his son's prior conviction, sentence, and incarceration. Id. at 875.
37. Although the identification of the defendant by his father was not crucial to any claim of
error raised on appeal, the court's reference to the father's testimony was not purely gratuitous. In
the court's words, the proof of former conviction through documentary evidence and independent
testimony was necessary to "fulfill the requirements of the law." Id.
Of course, if the defendant admits his prior convictions by stipulating to the validity of the
judgment and sentence forms introduced by the prosecution, the need for further independent proof
is obviated. See Clore v. State, 282 P.2d 780, 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955).
Tice was later relied on in Woods v. State, 327 P.2d 720 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958), wherein the
court held that a defendant's extra-judicial admissions detailing his former convictions to police
officers, absent admissible documentary evidence showing those convictions, could not satisfy the
State's burden of proof under the habitual offender statute. The court referred to Tice as setting
forth the "essential steps" for proving a former conviction. One of the essential steps noted is in-
dependent proof of the defendant's identity. Id. at 721-22.
38. 327 P.2d 720 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958), appeal dismissed, 346 P.2d 950 (Okla. Crim. App.
1959).
39. The seminal case is Gravatt v. United States, 260 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1958), wherein the
panel held that documentary evidence of former conviction was insufficient, standing alone, to sus-
tain the defendant's conviction under a federal habitual offender statute. In Gravatt, the prosecution
introduced a state-court judgment and sentence evidencing that one "Earl E. Gravatt" had been
convicted of a prior felony. A certified copy of the sheriff's return showing execution of the sentence
imposed on the former conviction was also submitted. On appeal, the defendant "Earl Elmer
Gravatt" contended that the documentary evidence constituted insufficient proof of his identity as
the same person who suffered the earlier conviction. Relying on the Woods independent proof stan-
dard, the panel agreed.
It is... Hornbook law that in criminal cases, the Government must prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that if the undisputed evidence is as consistent with
innocence as with guilt, the Government has failed to make a case to go to the jury. It is
common knowledge that in many instances men bear identical names. How then can it be
said, without more, that Earl E. Gravatt who was convicted in the Oklahoma State Court
in 1939 was one and the same person as Earl Elmer Gravatt on trial in this case. The
middle initial "E" certainly bears some significance. It could have been Edgar or Edward,
or some other name. It was not incumbent on the defendant to establish that he was not
the same person as Earl E. Gravatt. That duty rested upon the Government. .. . Merely
introducing the indictment or information and the judgment and sentence of the prior trial
is not sufficient to discharge the burden resting on the Government to take the case to the
jury on the question of identity of the two persons, especially when, as here, the two names
are not identical.
Id. at 499 (citations omitted).
Despite its apparent holding that documentary evidence, absent corroboration of identity, fails
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of a prior conviction, the rule of Gravatt has not been
interpreted as one of constitutional dimension. See Shaw v. Johnson, 786 F.2d 993, 999-1000 (10th
Cir. 1986) (independent evidence requirement is a matter of federal procedural law); but cf Chase v.
Crisp, 523 F.2d 595, 596 (10th Cir. 1975) (court indicated in dicta that state-court reliance on docu-
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stantiating proof of identity has since been vitiated in Oklahoma,' it has
endured as a federal requirement in cases before the Tenth Circuit.41
The rule requiring independent proof of identity reached its zenith
in Gilmore v. State4 2 and Baker v. State,43 cases in which the court, with
unmistakeable clarity, declared that the prosecution erred in its failure to
present direct evidence linking the identity of the defendant with the per-
son whose name appeared on court records of prior convictions. 4 In
Gilmore, the defendant denied on cross-examination the existence of a
previous conviction which was alleged in the charging instrument of the
principal offense. In rebuttal, the prosecution offered the judgment and
sentence form from the former conviction. The court found that the doc-
umentary evidence, standing alone, was insufficient as a matter of law to
rebut the defendant's denial.
The identity of the accused in the case must also be established on
trial as one and the same person as that convicted of the prior offense.
[W]hen the defendant positively denies on cross-examination the
conviction inquired about, that ends the matter, except by proof
thereof in rebuttal. A certified copy of the judgment and sentence
without proof of identity is not sufficient to establish the conviction of
the defendant.45
mentary evidence violates defendant's rights under the due process clause if no independent substan-
tiating evidence of identity is presented), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976).
40. See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
41. See, eg., United States v. Kilburn, 596 F.2d 928, 935 (10th Cir. 1978) (independent corrob-
oration of identity supplied by fact that trial judge on principal offense was same judge who presided
over and signed judgment and sentence in prior case against defendant), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966
(1979); Matula v. United States, 327 F.2d 337, 338 (10th Cir. 1964) (extra-judicial admission by
defendant that he had suffered prior felony conviction when coupled with introduction of judgment
and sentence from that conviction sufficient to prove defendant's commission of prior felony;
although, neither, standing alone, would have satisfied Government's burden of proof).
42. 365 P.2d 573 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961).
43. 432 P.2d 935 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967).
44. In Gilmore, failure to present direct evidence of identity on one prior conviction was held to
be harmless error because direct evidence establishing the defendant's conviction of other former
offenses had been offered. Gilmore, 365 P.2d at 575-76.
45. Id. at 575 (citations omitted). Because the defendant took the stand and affirmatively de-
nied the prior conviction alleged, Gilmore presented a slightly different situation than that which
arises in most cases where the issue of identity as a former offender is raised. It should not be
distinguished, however, from the typical case where the defendant simply chooses not to testify at
all. In terms of satisfying the burden of proof on a fact in issue in a criminal prosecution, no legal
distinction detrimental to the defendant should be fashioned on the exercise of the right not to
testify. The quantum of evidence necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's prior
conviction should remain the same, regardless of the tactical defense decisions made at trial. Requir-
ing the defendant to affirmatively deny the existence of an alleged prior conviction would, moreover,
place the defendant between the scylla of documentary proof sufficiently establishing the prosecu-
tion's case where he chooses not to testify, and the charybdis of prior "bad acts" evidence and other
forms of character impeachment if he chooses to deny the alleged former offenses on the stand.
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In Baker, the prosecution introduced documentary evidence purporting
to prove that the defendant, Leonard Joe Baker, had suffered four prior
felony convictions.46 On appeal, the court introspectively observed that
it had "consistently and repeatedly"4 7 held that the defendant's identity
must be proved independently of court records bearing his name in habit-
ual offender prosecutions.48
Thus, for two decades prosecutors in Oklahoma could not rely
solely on court documents to prove a defendant's prior conviction. If the
defendant affirmatively denied the alleged prior conviction, or chose not
to testify, the prosecution was required to offer direct or circumstantial
evidence that the defendant on trial for the principal offense was in fact
the same person whose name appeared on the records of a prior felony
conviction. The rationale for the rule was rarely stated in the reported
cases; perhaps the court thought it was obvious that the critical factor of
identity could not be proved reliably from a form containing no informa-
tion about the defendant other than his name, or a name similar to his,
typewritten in a blank space.49 Beginning in 1961, however, the court
abruptly shifted back to the documentary evidence standard.
III. THE MODERN PRIMA FACIE RULE
Under current law, a certified copy of a judgment and sentence bear-
mng a name similar or identical to that of the defendant from a prior
prosecution submitted into evidence in a case brought under Oklahoma's
habitual offender statutes, absent rebutting evidence to the contrary, con-
stitutes prima facie evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant on trial for the principal offense is a convicted
felon.5" Independent evidence in corroboration of the matters set forth in
the judgment and sentence is unnecessary.5 1 The genesis of the modern
46. With regard to one of the four alleged convictions, the court records indicated the name of
the defendant as "Joe Leonard Baker." Apparently, the three other records listed the defendant's
correct name. Baker, 432 P.2d at 938.
47. Id
48. Id. Decided in 1967 after the court had returned to the documentaryevidence standard, see
infra note 52 and accompanying text, the court's statements in Baker departed significantly from the
then existing doctrine. The court cited none of the current cases holding that documentary evidence
of former convictions satisfied the prosecution's burden of proof in habitual offender prosecutions.
One explanation for the court's departure is that numerous additional errors were committed at
Baker's trial, any one of which was sufficient to justify the court's modification of his sentence.
49. See the example of a typical judgment and sentence form in the appendix.
50. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
51. In light of the recent Supreme Court decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411
(1986), it is important to note that Oklahoma has always adhered to the rule that proof of prior
conviction in the punishment phase of a habitual offender proceeding must be established beyond a
[Vol. 22:29
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rule is found in the 1961 case of Williams v. State.52
A. Williams v. State
In Williams, the prosecution attempted to prove the defendant's sta-
tus as a repeat offender through the introduction of judgment and sen-
tence forms evidencing that one "Otto Williams" had been twice
convicted of felonies in Oklahoma. The prosecution offered no evidence
identifying the defendant as the same Williams whose name appeared on
the documents. Williams cited "numerous Oklahoma cases"53 which
purportedly supported his argument that the mere fact that the name
appearing on the court records was identical to his was insufficient to
establish the former convictions. He asserted that the allowance of this
proof only worked an undue hardship on defendants because it forced
them to take the witness stand in order to rebut the proof. Although the
court agreed that Williams' argument was "not without merit," 54 it de-
clared that "identity of name of the defendant and the person previously
convicted is prima facie evidence of identity of person, and in the absence
of rebutting testimony, supports a finding of such identity."55 Therefore,
the documentary evidence introduced was sufficient, standing alone, to
support the jury's verdict against the defendant on the habitual offender
reasonable doubt, and that it is a question for the jury to determine. See, eg., Mitchell v. State, 659
P.2d 366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Although the court has held that the habitual offender statute
does not create a new substantive criminal offense, defendants in the punishment phase are accorded
all of the procedural and substantive rights available to them during the trial on the principal offense.
The prescribed procedures and the statute itself are quite unlike the mandatory sentencing provision
addressed in McMillan.
52. 364 P.2d 702 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961).
53. Id. at 704.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citations omitted). Seemingly as an afterthought to its holding, the court advised that
"the better practice is (and should be followed whenever at all possible) to establish identity with
efficiency and diligence whenever the same is not rendered impossible by extenuating circum-
stances." Id. at 705. What the court meant by "efficiency and diligence" is open to (a rather moot)
question. The advice, coming as it did after a lamentation of the difficulty of acquiring independent
evidence of former conviction, probably means that the court would prefer such evidence to be
adduced wherever possible. After declaring that documentary evidence suffices to take the case to
the jury, one could well expect that, with the exception of extremely close cases, few prosecutors
would undertake the burden of finding corroborative evidence. For example, in Conner v. State, 518
P.2d 1271 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974), both the defendant and the prosecution relied on Williams on
the question whether the prosecution has any duty to attempt to obtain independent identification
evidence (the "better practice"). Resolving the issue in favor of the prosecution, the court concluded
that once a judgment and sentence of prior conviction has been introduced, the burden then shifts to
the defendant to rebut the prima facie evidence. If no rebuttal is offered, then the documentary
evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Id. at 1272. In effect, the court's holding renders the
"better practice" language of Williams merely precatory. Research indicates no case in which the
court has since reversed a habitual offender conviction based on its expressed preference for in-
dependent evidence.
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charge. The court's reasoning in Williams is difficult to understand and,
taken on its face, somewhat questionable. However, Williams is the sem-
inal case on which later cases uniformly relied, and thus it is necessary to
take a closer look at the court's analysis.
5 6
In establishing the documentary evidence prima facie rule, the court
relied primarily on the purported difficulty of obtaining witnesses with
personal knowledge of the defendant's criminal past. Although the Wil-
liams case involved prior Oklahoma convictions, the court reasoned that
prosecutors would bear a difficult burden of proving prior convictions
from other states if identification witnesses were a necessary element of
proof. Moreover, loss of memory by potential witnesses, or their inter-
vening death, could result in a similar impediment to the implementation
of the statute.5 7 In sum, the court crafted the documentary evidence rule
because of its fear that situations would arise where independent proof of
identity was not obtainable. 8
Finally, the court advised that the new rule would "leave the ques-
tion of identity to be determined by the jury upon a consideration of all
surrounding facts and circumstances,5 9 such as commonness or unusual-
56. It should be noted, however, that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals does not habit-
ually overload its decisions with expansive analysis of its reasoning. Moreover, the court often does
not set forth sufficient facts to allow its readers to discern accurately and confidently the ramifica-
tions of its holdings. Williams stands apart from a multitude of decisions addressing similar issues
under the habitual offender statutes in that the court supplied a clear, albeit questionable, rationale
for the decision it rendered.
57. Williams, 364 P.2d at 704. Citing these possibilities, the court then asked the following
rhetorical question: "Is this any reason for not invoking the habitual criminal act when it [sic] clearly
falls within the purview of the act?" Id. The question can be refrained with more precision. In
effect, the court was inquiring whether it was justified in crafting a broad rule for all cases allowing
the imposition of severe penal consequences based on evidence of questionable probative value be-
cause more competent evidence might be beyond the prosecution's reach in individual cases.
The court also surmised that where the name appearing on the documentary evidence of prior
conviction was identical to the defendant's name, there would be "an extremely narrow margin of
mistake." Id In view of the court's expressed apprehension of out of state prior offenders and the
difficulties associated with proving foreign offenses, it is curious that the court could so confidently
presume, without reference to any statistical evidence, that disparities between names and identities
are likely to be remote. Even if one could assume that the court had philological expertise with
regard to both national and local patterns of name-giving and access to statistics correlating the
number of persons with identical names and their propensity to commit acts of recidivism, the re-
sulting generalization would remain questionable.
58. Interestingly, the court asserted that "[a]n exhaustive search of all Oklahoma cases relating
to the manner of proving the former convictions when the names are identical reveal[ed] that the
direct question ha[d] never been squarely ruled upon." Id. The opinion contains not a single cita-
tion to any of the predecessor cases under the habitual offender or liquor law recidivist provisions.
For authority, the court noted that other jurisdictions had adopted the documentary evidence
prima facie rule. See Annot., 11 A.L.Rt2d 870 (1950) (discussing cases dealing with the necessity,
character, and sufficiency of evidence of identity for the purposes of a statute enhancing punishment
in case of prior conviction).
59. It should be noted that Williams was decided prior to the modern bifurcation requirement
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ness of the name, the character of the former crime or crimes, 6° and the
place of its commission., 61  The court did not, however, advise trial
courts that a jury instruction to this effect was necessary. 62 As discussed
below, the court's newfound emphasis on jury consideration signaled a
shift in the court's focus which resulted in the application of a much
more arduous standard of appellate review, from the defendant's per-
spective, than had previously been applied.63
B. Application of the Modern Standard
With regard to the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a con-
viction, the history of the case law applying Oklahoma's habitual of-
fender provisions bespeaks three significant changes in judicial thinking.
Appellate review under the initial documentary evidence standard, which
was derived from the early application of the liquor law recidivist stat-
utes, turned on a critical evaluation of the written contents of the docu-
ments introduced as proof of former conviction." Even minor
discrepancies in pleading and proof were not tolerated. Gradually, the
focus of review shifted away from the specific words and phrases appear-
ing in court documents toward a more exacting scrutiny of the trial rec-
ord as a whole, with particular emphasis placed on the need for
independent direct or circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant
with the alleged prior convictions.6  The modern prima facie standard,
which has become quite entrenched since its early application in the
1960's, can best be summarized as one of judicial disengagement. The
in prosecutions under the habitual offender statutes. See infra note 69 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the modem bifurcation procedure. Thus, the jury's consideration of "all the surround-
ing facts and circumstances" took place while it was deliberating the defendant's guilt on the princi-
pal charge.
60. For the purpose of assessing identity as a prior offender, it is curious that the court believed
that the "character of the former crime or crimes" was a relevant criterion. Moreover, detailed
evidence concerning the character of alleged prior offenses, if at all relevant to the question of iden-
tity, would have been extremely prejudicial to the defendant, particularly if the evidence was inad-
missible for the purpose of proving the defendant's guilt on the principal charge. Cf. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, § 2404 (B) (1981) (evidence of prior crimes not admissible to prove "bad" character of de-
fendant in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith; it may, however, be admissible as
proof of identity on the principal offense); Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979)
(prior to admission, prosecution must prove the defendant's commission of former crimes by clear
and convincing evidence).
61. Williams, 364 P.2d at 704.
62. In subsequent cases, the court has at least implied that a jury instruction directing consider-
ation of the totality of circumstances present should be given. See, eg., Sessions v. State, 494 P.2d
351, 354 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
63. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
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elevation of documentary evidence to its current status as presumptive
proof of recidivism has had the residual effect of reposing a vast amount
of discretion in trial juries whose determinations are practically unassail-
able on appeal.
The court has frequently held that all questions of fact are vested
exclusively in the domain of the jury once a prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution.6 If a prima facie case has been met, the
court will not interfere with a jury verdict, notwithstanding the existence
of sharp conflicts in the evidence or the fact that inferences from the
evidence contradictory to the verdict were more plausible. 7 Although
this rule is a common general principle of criminal procedure, it takes on
new meaning in habitual offender prosecutions where, by judicial fiat, the
prosecutorial burden is extremely slight. 8 A brief look into the typical
jury perspective illuminates the hazards faced by defendants in habitual
offender cases.
The modem bifurcation procedure for habitual offender cases was
established by the court with an eye toward protecting the defendant
from the inherent prejudice associated with apprising the jurors of the
defendant's alleged former crimes prior to determination of guilt on the
principal offense.69 The court decisions, however, fail to recognize that a
66. See Cardenas v. State, 695 P.2d 876 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Renfro v. State, 607 P.2d
703, 705 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
67. See Glover v. State, 557 P.2d 922, 927 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 922
(1977) (quoting Williams v. State, 373 P.2d 91, 94 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962)).
68. See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the kinds of documentary
evidence which can sustain the prosecution's prima facie case.
69. The court adopted the bifurcation procedure in Harris v. State, 369 P.2d 187 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1962). In a syllabus to the opinion, the court set forth the following requirements:
5. The information should be divided into two parts. In the first the particular offense
with which the accused is charged should be set forth, and this should be upon the first
page of the information and signed by the prosecuting officer. In the second part former
convictions should be alleged, and this should be upon the second page of the information,
separable from the first page and signed by the prosecuting officer.
6. The entire information should be read to the accused and his plea taken in the absence
of the jurors. When the jury has been impaneled and sworn, there should be read to them
only that part of the information which sets forth the crime for which the accused is to be
tried. The trial should then proceed in every respect as if there were no allegations of
former convictions, of which no mention should be made in the evidence or in the remarks
of counsel, or in the charge of the court. When the jury retire to consider their verdict,
only the first page of the information on which the charged [sic] is set out, should be given
to them.
7. The jury at this junction of the trial should be charged with the sole responsibility of
reaching a verdict as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant upon the charge for which
he is being tried. If the jury then returns with a verdict of guilty, then evidence should be
presented to prove the second portion of the information as to the previous convictions.
The jury will then retire to assess the punishment within the limits prescribed by statute for
the primary offense or if they find he was guilty of a previous conviction, then and in that
event they may set the punishment as set forth in [the habitual offender statute].
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 22 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss1/2
PROOF OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS
jury operating under the bifurcated procedure may be similarly
prejudiced in the habitual offender stage of the proceeding because it had
just convicted the defendant of the principal offense.70 Indeed, the preju-
dice may be even greater in the second stage because the jury is certain
that the defendant has committed the principal offense. Under the bifur-
cation procedure, the taint of the "prior" offense, the principal crime, on
the juror's perception of the defendant's character is fresh in the juror's
mind because the presentation of minute details concerning the defend-
ant's criminal acts has just been completed. At this point in the proceed-
ing, it is unlikely that a jury can address with fairness and impartiality a
new factual issue which bears directly on the sentence the defendant will
ultimately receive.71 The extremely slight burden of presumptively es-
tablishing the defendant's guilt through documentary evidence coupled
with the corresponding jury instruction to this effect act as catalysts to
the pre-existing prejudice, thereby increasing substantially the likelihood
of conviction.
Further stacking the deck against the defendant is the prosecutorial
invective which becomes permissible during the second stage of the pro-
ceedings. The stigma of alleged prior convictions can invoke a lashing
derogation of the defendant's character during the prosecutor's closing
argument.72 For example, in Louder v. State,73 the court upheld com-
mentary which explained to the jury that the defendant "likes to burglar-
ize things."74 In Fogle v. State,75 the court approved the practice of
referring to the defendant as a "career criminal" and allowed the prose-
cutor to suggest to the jury that the defendant will commit more crimes
Id. at 189.
This court established procedure was later enacted into law by the Oklahoma legislature, see
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 860 (1981). It should be noted that the procedure is inapplicable in cases
where the former conviction is an element of the principal offense. See, eg., Hines v. State, 684 P.2d
1202 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (jury must have knowledge of defendant's prior felony conviction in
order to convict him of possessing firearm after former conviction of felony).
70. Although the legislative purpose underlying the habitual offender provisions is to impose
lengthier punishments on recidivists for subsequent offenses, the factual question of recidivism fo-
cuses on prior crimes. In deciding the issue, the jury should not be influenced by the defendant's
guilt on the principal charge.
71. As a general rule in Oklahoma, the jury assesses the sentence against the defendant. The
judge, however, may determine the length of punishment if the defendant afirmatively requests him
to do so, or if the jury fails or is unable to do so. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 926-28 (1981).
72. The opprobrious closing statements permissible during the second stage of the case would,
in most cases, amount to reversible error if uttered during the first stage. See Fogle v. State, 700 P.2d
208, 211 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Conway v. State, 581 P.2d 40 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
73. 568 P.2d 344 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
74. Id. at 348.
75. 700 P.2d 208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
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in the future.76 Even predicting the defendant's return to a life of crime
is permissible if it "is not unfounded in the evidence."' 77 In sum, the
defendant in the second stage of a habitual offender proceeding is likely
to face a jury that is both predisposed toward conviction and inclined to
impose the maximum sentence allowable.
A final factor which ultimately weighs heavily against defendants in
habitual offender prosecutions is the nature and amount of scrutiny with
which the court reviews appeals of habitual offender convictions. An ini-
tial hurdle arises from the court's long-standing precedent that in review-
ing evidence to determine whether the state has established a prima facie
case, it will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state.7 8
Secondly, as previously observed, an adverse verdict rendered on prima
facie evidence is practically unchallengeable on sufficiency grounds. 79
Therefore, the prosecution enjoys a relatively light burden of proof to
establish its prima facie case,8" and an exceedingly small number of ap-
pellate modifications81 result from the appeals.
Standing alone, the preceding peculiarities of habitual offender cases
may not appear so egregious. When they are considered in conjunction
76. Id at 211. See also Roberts v. State, 550 P.2d 971, 973 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (upholding
the prosecutor's use of the word "thief" when referring to defendant in closing statement).
77. Fogle, 700 P.2d at 211. The court's use of a double negative raises some interesting pos-
sibilities. Is a reference to future acts of recidivism justified when no crediblo evidence of former
convictions has been presented? Certainly the prosecutor, on appeal, can point out that the jury had
just determined the defendant's guilt for the principal offense. In short, the court has not yet recog-
nized the potential effect such obloquy may have on a jury in the rare case where it finds the defend-
ant not guilty on the habitual offender charge. Because the bifurcation procedure postpones
sentencing on the principal offense until the completion of the second stage of the proceedings, the
prosecution's comments, although error if uttered during the first stage, would be communicated to
the jury with the same prejudicial impact. Simply because the court frequently exercises its power to
reduce sentences because of the commission of irreversible error does not mean it should approve
practices which tend to "set the stage" for such mistakes to occur.
78. Renfro v. State, 607 P.2d 703, 705 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); Alderman v. Territory, 1
Okla. Crim. 562, 98 P. 1026 (1909).
79. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
80. The effort required of the prosecutor is truly minimal. In most cases, a telephone call or a
computer name check will produce prima facie evidence. In sum, the duties of the prosecutor can be
entirely delegated to a secretary. The prima facie rule encourages prosecutors to include habitual
offender charges in charging documents upon the uncovering of a judgment and sentence form bear-
ing the defendant's name without any further investigation. Naturally, this leads to the adoption of
a "wait and see" attitude: if the defendant is able to produce rebutting evidence, the prosecutor has
lost nothing because his conviction on the principal offense is already secured.
81. The court has ruled that errors committed in the second stage of a habitual offender pro.
ceeding do not justify reversal, but rather sentence modification, because the conviction on the prin-
cipal charge remains outstanding. See, eg., Shoemaker v. State, 479 P. 2d 621 (Okla. Crim. App.
1971) (where improper instruction to jury might have caused jury to impose greater sentence, sen-
tence was modified from not less than 15 years nor more than 45 years to indeterminate term of not
less than 10 years nor more than 30 years). The court's power to modify sentences is statutory. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1066 (1981).
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with the documentary evidence prima facie standard, however, it be-
comes apparent that defendants have suffered, in the last twenty years, a
rather large diminution of their rights. Defendants charged under a ha-
bitual offender provision are in a precarious position because of the na-
ture of the documentary evidence which is deemed to satisfy the
prosecution's case and because they are literally forced to present rebut-
ting evidence under the current standard. Juror prejudice, the inflam-
matory remarks of prosecutors, and the meager standard of appellate
review only add to the defendant's woes.
As .previously observed, the Williams documentary evidence rule
evolved as a result of the court's belief that corroborating evidence, direct
or circumstantial, might be difficult to obtain. Thus, the court had no
qualms with shifting the burden of production to the defendant to rebut
the documents introduced to prove his former conviction. Perhaps the
court felt that defendants could more easily acquire the necessary rebut-
ting evidence in cases of mistaken identity. The validity of this proposi-
tion, however, is by no means unquestionable. If the prosecution is
unable to find any person with personal knowledge of the defendant's
previous conviction, the defendant faces a similar hardship in producing
someone who can testify that the defendant was not previously con-
victed.8" Moreover, the rule invites prosecutors to end their investiga-
tions when they have "uncovered" a court record bearing a name similar
to the defendant's.83 A defendant mistakenly charged under a habitual
offender statute may be tempted not to engage in a pretrial search for
rebutting evidence because of an erroneous belief that the prosecution
will be unable to prove a former conviction that did not occur. Indeed, it
is reasonable to assume that such a defendant would more likely concen-
trate on preparing his defense to the principal charge.
The documentary evidence prima facie rule also betrays a judicial
82. The defendant faces this hardship, for example, when the alleged prior conviction occurred
outside of Oklahoma and the defendant had been incarcerated since the time of his arrest on the
principal charge. Of course the defendant may always choose to testify in his own behalf. However,
the weight accorded the defendant's testimonial denials during the second stage of the proceedings
would likely be much less than the prejudicial consequences of his choice to take the stand. The
prosecutor can impeach the defendant with his former conviction on the principal offense, effectively
reminding the jury that it has convicted the witness of a felony, and introduce general character
evidence against the defendant. It can be fairly stated that during the second stage of a habitual
offender prosecution, a defendant would be unwise to take any chances of exacerbating the negative
light in which he is already held by the jury. Therefore, the documentary evidence standard imposes
a Hobson's choice on the defendant who is unable to produce a rebutting witness.
83. The sheer number of cases reported in which the state relied solely on court records to
prove the defendant's former conviction support this assertion.
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conviction that such evidence is inherently reliable as proof of the de-
fendant's former conviction.84 Unfortunately, the nature of the docu-
mentary evidence which has been deemed to satisfy the standard belies
the court's conviction. For example, the most typical case arises where
the prosecution utilizes a certified copy of an Oklahoma judgment and
sentence form as proof of prior conviction.85 Introduction of judgment
and sentence forms has consistently been upheld as satisfying the prose-
cution's prima facie case.86 Judgment and sentence documents, however,
are not uniform throughout the state. Each judicial district typically
composes its own version. As a general rule, the only information on the
form concerning the identity of the defendant is his name typewritten
into a blank space on the sheet. No other identifying characteristics are
set forth.87
In cases where judgment and sentence forms were unavailable, the
court has cast its imprimatur on other kinds of documentary evidence
submitted as proof of former conviction. In Wade v. State 8 for instance,
the prosecution proved the defendant's prior Louisiana convictions
through the introduction of a "court minute" which named the defend-
ant and recited that sentence was rendered against him upon a plea of
guilty to the felony charge. The documents did not bear the presiding
judge's signature. On appeal, the defendant challenged the document as
inadmissible hearsay, not within the exception for "final judgments."8 9
Upholding the conviction, the court reasoned that the "final judgment"
exception, which requires, along with other elements, the presence of the
presiding judge's signature, "applies by its terms to a final judgment of-
fered to prove a fact essential to the judgment. This is not the case Where
the fact to be proved is the historical occurrence of the conviction for
84. Would it not be reasonable to infer, where corroborating evidence is unavailable, that docu-
mentary evidence is less reliable because the prosecution cannot corroborate it?
85. See Fogle v. State, 700 P.2d 208, 212 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Welliver v. State, 620 P.2d
438, 440 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
86. Prior to 1981, proof of out of state convictions by documentary evidence fell within an
Oklahoma statute requiring triple certification. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 485 (1971). In 1981, the court
held the statute inapplicable to the admission of foreign court documents as proof of prior conviction
in habitual offender proceedings. Wade v. State, 624 P.2d 86, 91 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981). Such
documents now typically qualify for admission under the self-authentication provision of the
Oklahoma Evidence Code. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2902 (1981).
87. Some districts indicate on their forms that the defendant is over twenty-one years of age;
others actually state the defendant's age. The defendant's name is the only additional identification
provided. Thus, the court in adopting the documentary evidence standard, also necessarily embraced
the rule that identity of name constitutes prima facie evidence of identity of person.
88. 624 P.2d 86 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981).
89. Id. at 91.
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habitual offender purposes." 9 The court went on to hold the court min-
ute admissible under the hearsay exception for public records because
"no issue as to the definition of judgment is presented."91 Moreover, the
court minute was deemed sufficient to establish prior conviction.92 "Fi-
nal judgments" are not the only acceptable means of proving prior con-
victions; therefore, the exact nature of alternative "public records" which
will satisfy the state's prima facie case remains an open question.93
Equally unclear is the necessary degree of uniformity between the
name appearing on the court records and the name of the defendant on
trial. Although the prima facie rule vests ultimate discretion in the jury
to determine whether the defendant is the same person whose name ap-
pears on the introduced documents, the reported decisions demonstrate
that for purposes of establishing the prima facie case, the name listed on
the court records need not exactly match the defendant's name. For ex-
ample, middle initial or middle name discrepancies between the docu-
mented name and the defendant's name will not extinguish the prima
facie case.94 Moreover, the court has intimated that the entire name of
the defendant may be different from that appearing on the documents so
long as the names are "similar." 95 Finally, it should be noted that the
court has on occasion implied that if a defendant's name is "sufficiently
common," a prima facie case based solely on documentary evidence bear-
90. Id.
91. Id. (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 92. The court noted that a judge's signature is not required under Lousiana law and
that use of court minutes to prove the former conviction charge is an accepted mode of evidence in
Lousiana's own courts for proving habitual offender charges.
93. At a minimum, acceptable documentary evidence must be certifiable and must also show
that the defendant was represented by counsel in the prior case wherein the defendant was convicted
of a penitentiary offense. See, eg., Lawson v. State, 486 P.2d 759, 762 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)
(police "rap sheet" held inadmissible to prove former conviction); Pearce v. State, 456 P.2d 630, 632
(Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (Kansas trial judge's "certificate" held insufficient to prove former convic-
tion). The nature of the "certificate" deemed inadequate in Pearce is not described in the opinion;
after Wade, it seems possible that such a certificate would be sufficient if it complied with the mini-
mum elements of proof in the state from which it originated. See supra notes 8 8-92 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Wade. See also State v. Frazier, 563 P.2d 656, 658 (Okla. Crim. App.
1977) (a certified order of deferment of judgment and sentence should be given the same weight on
the issue of identification as a judgment offered as proof of a prior conviction).
94. See, eg., Lewis v. State, 681 P.2d 772, 774 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (defendant Alexander
Dumas Lewis' argument that judgment and sentence bearing name Alexander D. Lewis was insuffi-
cient to create presumption of identity held "wholly without merit"); Dodson v. State, 674 P.2d 57,
59 (Okia. Crim. App. 1984) (fact that defendant's middle initial was missing did not render judg-
ment and sentence insufficient as prima facie evidence of identity of the person).
95. Cardenas v. State, 695 P.2d 876, 879 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). In Cardenas, the court did
not disclose the disparity between the defendant's name and the name appearing on the judgments
and sentences introduced as proof of his former convictions.
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ing the common name may be negated. 96 The court, however, has never
set forth standards for determining "sufficient commonality," and has
only once held that the defendant's name met the unspecified standard. 97
The recent concurring opinion of Judge Parks in Henager v. State98
analyzes the application of the prima facie identity aspect of the prima
facie rule, whereas the majority opinion merely reaffirms the panoply of
decisions applying the documentary evidence prima facie rule.99 In
Henager, the defendant on appeal challenged the constitutionality of the
rule and urged the court to adopt the Tenth Circuit's rule t°° that cor-
roborating evidence of identity must be introduced to support a convic-
tion under a habitual offender statute. Quite surprisingly, Judge Parks
declared that the court's prior cases did not establish a prima facie rule
based on identity of name. 1 He interpreted the case law as "clearly
indicat[ing] that there must be other 'facts and circumstances' for the
jury to consider in reaching their verdict."" °2 In his opinion, however,
the fact that the defendant possesses an "unusual" name is an additional
"fact and circumstance" which justifies a jury finding of identity of per-
96. See Brown v. State, 578 P.2d 364, 366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) ("John Hubert Brown" not
sufficiently common to warrant negation); State v. Frazier, 563 P.2d 656, 658 (Okla. Crim. App.
1977) ( "Dennis Frazier" not sufficiently common as to negate the prima facie identification).
97. Smith v. State, 695 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) ("James E. Smith" deemed to
be "far too common a name" to support prima facie case grounded solely on documents bearing that
name). In Smith, the court observed that the documents introduced as proof of former conviction
originated from Texas and were eleven years old. Perhaps, the court's observation may serve to
distinguish a future case involving a defendant with a common name if the alleged prior conviction is
local and recent.
98. 716 P.2d 669 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
99. One interesting statement in the opinion refers to the defendant's claim that the documen-
tary evidence prima facie rule is constitutionally deficient and that the court should adopt the Tenth
Circuit's corroboration requirement. The court noted that" adoption of [the Tenth Circuit's] posi-
tion may, at some future point, be necessary." Id. at 676. One wonders why the court would make
such a statement if it did not suspect that its rule stood on questionable footing.
100. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
101. The Judge asserted that "this Court has never held that identity of name alone is sufficient
evidence of former conviction." Henager, 716 P.2d at 677-78. However, Judge Parks own opinion in
Gross v. State, 706 P.2d 914 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985),rendered just five months earlier, tends to belie
this assertion. The prosecution in Gross introduced, in addition to prior judgment and sentence
forms, "mug shots" of the defendant and a document containing a copy of his fingerprints from his
former conviction. Writing for the court, Judge Parks stated the following: "We first note that the
State produced the appellant's photograph in addition to the judgment abstract. Furthermore, even
if the State had produced only the abstracts, the similarity of names would have provided a sufficient
basis for the jury's finding." Id. at 915 (emphasis added).
.102. Henager, 716 P.2d at 678. The Judge cited Williams v. State, 364 P.2d 702, 704 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1961) for this proposition. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Williams. Nowhere in Williams, however, is there a requirement that evidence must be introduced
over and above court records bearing the defendant's name to sustain the state's prima facie case.
The reference to "facts and circumstances" in Williams only indicates that the jury should be in-
structed to take into account surrounding facts and circumstances on the identity issue.
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son. The correct rule according to Judge Parks is that, in the absence of
additional "facts and circumstances," identity of name only supports a
finding of identity of person but is not sufficient standing alone to sustain
such a finding.10 3
Judge Parks' statement that an unusual name constitutes an addi-
tional "fact and circumstance" sufficient to sustain a jury's finding of
identity is problematic. Without providing any "standard of unusual-
ness," it will not only be difficult to apply; but, when applied, it might
open the door to an equal protection challenge. Clearly, an additional
burden placed on the shoulders of a criminal defendant which is based on
the defendant's name, something which he is powerless to control,
amounts to a classification properly subject to fourteenth amendment
analysis. In light of the frequency of habitual offender appeals, an analy-
sis becomes necessary.
In view of the court's decision in Smith v. State,"° where it held that
the name "James E. Smith" was too common to support a prima facie
case based on documents alone, it is odd that Judge Parks in Henager
chose to frame a "new" analysis grounded on unusualness of name as an
additional fact or circumstance bearing on the establishment of a prima
facie case. Perhaps he perceived a potential constitutional invalidity in
the rule that identity of name, without more, is sufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt identity of person. If such an invalidity exists, how-
ever, it is doubtful that Judge Parks' new way of addressing the situation
will provide a sufficient cure.
IV. THE PRIMA FACIE RULE AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
From the foregoing analysis, it should not pass unnoticed that the
prima facie rule allows prosecutors to establish their case without calling
a single witness to the stand. The punishment stage of the habitual of-
fender proceeding is complete upon the introduction of self-authenticat-
ing hearsay evidence. In our adversarial system, however, the denial of
the criminal defendant's right of cross-examination is not rendered auto-
matically constitutional simply because the proffered evidence fits within
a legislatively recognized hearsay exception. Yet, this is the practical ef-
fect of the prima facie rule.
The Supreme Court has invoked the protections embodied in the
103. Henager, 716 P.2d at 678.
104. 695 P.2d 1360 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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sixth amendment confrontation clause 10 5 to reverse convictions when the
defendant was deprived an opportunity to challenge critical inculpatory
evidence through cross-examination, notwithstanding the technical ad-
missibility of the evidence.1" 6 The decisions evince a marked preference
by the Court for the production of witnesses over hearsay evidence.
To date, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has not recon-
ciled the mandates of the confrontation clause with its procedure for es-
tablishing the prima facie guilt of habitual offenders.10 7  Clearly, the
105. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. CONsr. amend. VI. The right to confrontation is essentially a "trial
right" which, in 1965, was made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965).
106. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980), the Court recognized that the confrontation
clause "countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material de-
parture from the reason of the general rule' (which forbids its use)." (quoting Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)). In Roberts, the Court held that the sixth amendment bars admission
of hearsay statements asserted by declarants who are unavailable for cross-examination at trial, un-
less the proffered statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability, however, can be in-
ferred if the evidence falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. See
also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57 nn.9-10 (1970) ("it is this literal right to 'confront' the
witness at the time of the trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause").
In the most recent ease addressing the subject, the Court reaffirmed that "there are few subjects,
perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in the
expressions of belief that the right to confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and funda-
mental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." Lee v.
Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (1986) (quoting Pointer v. Texas 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965). In Lee, the
defendant's murder conviction was based on the trial court's substantive use of a co-defendant's
hearsay confession (the co-defendant did not testify) implicating the defendant. The Court deter-
mined that accomplice confessions, despite their technical admissibility in joint trials, are presump-
tively unreliable and the trial court's reliance thereon deprived the defendant of her rights
guaranteed by the confrontation clause.
107. On three occasions, the court has superficially addressed the sixth amendment confronta-
tion clause implications of its recidivist procedure. In Hardin v. State, 649 P.2d 799 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1982), the defendant asserted on appeal "that the mere presentation of the judgment and sen-
tence documenting his prior conviction, without providing an authenticating witness, denied him of
his right to confront witnesses against him and to cross-examine the witnesses." Id. at 803. Holding
that "an authenticating witness clearly is not required," the court chided the defendant for his failure
to support his sixth amendment argument "with any reference to evidence or citation of authority."
Id. Aside from restating its prima facie rule, the court furnished no further reasoning for its holding.
It should be noted that the claim was directed only to the hearsay use of the judgment and sentence.
At trial, the defendant submitted to cross-examination and admitted the existence of prior convic-
tions. Therefore, any assertions concerning the identity issue, had they been made, would have
probably encountered harmless error analysis. This writer sympathizes with the defendant's failure
to cite appropriate authority because little authority exists which is directly applicable to the issues
presented.
In Tucker v. State, 620 P.2d 1314 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) and Williams v. State, 661 P.2d 911
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983), the defendants claimed due process error in the trial court's handling of
pre-trial stipulations in which they had admitted they were the same persons who had been previ-
ously convicted of crimes based on judgment and sentence forms. In Tucker, the defendant asserted
that the stipulation, which was not a guilty plea, had the effect of impermissibly relieving the state of
its burden of proving the existence of his prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. Tucker, 620
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prosecution's case relies on the introduction of hearsay evidence which is
admitted through the well-recognized exception for "public records."
The document, typically a judgment and sentence form, is used first for
the truth of the matter it asserts-that the person named in it has suf-
fered a previous conviction. Arguably, no further hearsay problem is
presented when the prosecutor utilizes the document to establish the crit-
ical identity link between the defendant on trial and the person whose
name appears on the document. In this secondary function, however, the
name appearing on the document takes on independent significance-it
establishes the existence of the name itself. Thus, the relevancy of the
court record derives, in the first instance, from its inherent reliability as
proof of the existence of a prior conviction, which justifies its exception
from the hearsay rule, and then, from the similarity of names. Although
this distinction"'8 has never been identified in the reported cases, it raises
P.2d at 1317. Moreover, the defendant urged that the stipulation in effect acted as an (invalid)
waiver of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. The court noted:
The stipulation in no way relieved the State of its burden of proof.... [TMhis burden was
met [because] [c]opies of the judgments and sentences with the name of the appellant
thereon were entered into evidence. This alone, in the absence of rebutting evidence, could
have supported a finding that there had been former convictions. Such a finding was merely
buttressed by the stipulation of the appellant.
Id. (citation omitted).
More importantly, on the second claim, the court determined that the stipulation entered into
was not a guilty plea, which under due process standards would have required the judge to inform
the defendant that he was relinquishing his rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses against
him. Id. at 1317-18. Because the judgment and sentences entered into evidence constituted in-
dependent prima facie proof of his former conviction, the court held that by virtue of the stipulation
"The appellant waived his right to confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses as to his former
felony convictions." Id. at 1318.
The facts in Williams are nearly identical to those of Tucker. The defendant asserted that his
stipulation that he was one and the same person who had been previously convicted of armed rob-
bery in Kentucky amounted to a guilty plea and failed to comply with due process requirements.
Williams, 661 P.2d at 913. The court's response is worthy of quotation:
We have previously addressed the issue now before us, and for the reasons stated in Tucker
v. State, .... this assignment of error is without merit. A copy of the judgment and
sentence, with the name of the appellant appearing thereon, was entered into evidence; this
alone, in the absence of rebutting evidence, could have supported the jury's finding. The
stipulation was not to the former conviction, but only what certain testimony would be; the
appellant waived his right to confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses as to his
former felony conviction.
Id. at 913-14.
These cases are as important as they are puzzling. Without question, the court's statements
indicate recognition of the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses in
the punishment stage of the habitual offender proceeding. The obviously puzzling factor is that in
both cases, the court clearly affirms that the prosecution need not call any witnesses to the stand. No
explanation of this inconsistency is offered. Although the Williams court adverted to "the reasons
stated in Tucker," the Tucker opinion provides little explanation on this point.
108. To understand this distinction, note that one need not rely on the truth of a document
which asserts that X committed Y crime in later attempting to prove that X is the same X who
committed a subsequent crime. Obviously, however, if it is not first proved that X committed Y
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questions of constitutional magnitude which cannot be cured by resort to
the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness which justify the hear-
say exception permitting the introduction of the documentary evidence.
Many commentators believe that, conditioned upon the specific use
made of "public records" at trial, the usual attending circumstances asso-
ciated with these documents strongly suggest trustworthiness sufficient to
overcome the second prong of the Supreme Court's confrontation clause
test.109 Moreover, it has been noted that in the "typical" case where
public documents are admitted into evidence, the courtroom presence of
the person responsible for creating the document would not be helpful to
the accused. 110 Although it might seem that both of these observations
should apply to the normal use of court documents to evidence prior
convictions in the punishment stage of recidivist proceedings, it is equally
clear that neither the historical justification for the hearsay exception it-
self, nor the absence of a need for confrontation, suitably applies to the
circumstantial use of documentary evidence as proof of identity. In
short, this use of the court document is entirely unrelated to the indicia
of reliability which justify its admission into evidence. While the defend-
ant may not need to cross-examine the document's maker on the issue of
whether a prior conviction in fact occurred, his need to test the memory,
perception, and sincerity of a person possessing personal knowledge of
the critical identity link is readily apparent.
At the same time, however, employment of the court document as
the exclusive means of proving identity cannot be considered wholly sep-
arate from the fact that the proof springs from evidence which owes its
admission to a hearsay exception. Before a finding of identity can be
made, the jury must first accept that the name appearing in the document
was the true name of the person allegedly convicted (hearsay use), and
crime, the fact that there is only one person named X in the entire world would be irrelevant for the
purposes of the recidivist proceeding. Thus, the circumstantial use of the name appearing in the prior
court record is conditioned on the hearsay use of the document.
109. See, eg., Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV.
207, 225 (1984); Comment, Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L.
RE,. 651, 668 (1970). See also the authorities cited by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66 n.9 (1980).
110. See Lilly, supra note 109, at 225, 227. Professor Lilly forecasts that the Court would not
strictly adhere to the "demonstration of unavailability" prong of the confrontation clause test in
situations where the utility of trial confrontation is remote. However, he does observe, "The utility
of confrontation cannot always be determined from the particular hearsay exception in question, but
will sometimes turn upon the circumstances in which the exception is applied." Id. at 227-28. For
example, at least one federal circuit has required a demonstration of unavailability prior to the ad-
mission of documents under the "business records" exception. See United States v. Washington, 688
F.2d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 1982).
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second, that the named person was actually convicted as the document
asserts (hearsay use). Once these foundational steps are completed, the
prosecutor offers the very same piece of evidence as the sole proof of
identity. Although the presumed reliability of the document obviously
does not extend to the identity question, its use becomes so inextricably
intertwined with the preceding hearsay uses that a jury would naturally
be misled into thinking that its probative value is uniform on both is-
sues.'11 Certainly, the acknowledgement of a right to confront and cross-
examine a witness would permit the defendant to shed light on the
distinction.
In sum, a similarity between names may, in the abstract, raise a
question of identity sufficient for jury determination, but the modem evi-
dentiary procedure for introducing the similarity to the jury simply ig-
nores the sixth amendment.'" 2 As previously noted, the current practice
tacitly encourages prosecutors to rest their case after producing a mini-
mum amount of evidence. No demonstration of unavailability of wit-
nesses with personal knowledge is required; the defendant stands alone
bearing a burden of production against the unchallengeable inferences
created by a self-authenticating document.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the legal theory crafted to challenge the procedure for
proving prior convictions, and there are a number of viable possibilities
not addressed in this study, the controversy on the identity issue should
most accurately and reasonably center on questions of efficacy. The con-
cem that the modem system may not produce a consistently reliable re-
sult must be laid to rest, if possible, by convincing proof of a verifiable
relationship between names in the abstract and human beings. The
court's continuing dogmatic adherence to the prima facie rule cannot be
111. It should again be noted that the typical judgment and sentence form offered as proof of
former conviction contains no information about the person convicted other than his name. Perhaps
if the state were to adopt a uniform requirement that all districts must include relevant vital statistics
concerning the defendant (physical description, address, social security number, and other descrip-
tive information) on judgment and sentence forms, their probative value on the identity issue would
be increased to a tolerable level. This, however, would not obviate the prosecutor's responsibility to
establish the unavailability of witnesses.
112. Although an extensive sixth amendment analysis is well beyond the scope of this study, it
should be noted that the Supreme Court, construing a sentence enhancement procedure under the
Colorado Sex Offenders Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 (1963), held: "Due process...
requires that he [the defendant] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be con-
fronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his
own." Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967). The Court noted that the case was not unlike
cases under recidivist statutes where the habitual criminal issue is a "distinct issue." Id.
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rendered palatable based on this premise. Absent a showing of at least
statistical probability, the presumption of identity should be repudiated.
Every month or two, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections
compiles a list of names of persons who are either presently incarcerated
in Oklahoma's prisons or have been recently released. A quick glance at
the most recent list reveals that the court's presumption that identity of
name equals identity of person is in fact a very tenuous reed. Persons
bearing identical names are frequently encountered throughout the docu-
ment.1 1 3 Thus, even if one were to accept the questionable assumption
that a person found guilty of committing a crime in Oklahoma has likely
been the subject of prior Oklahoma convictions, the list itself suggests
that it would still be error to embrace the court's prima facie identity
rule. Of course, the reality of the situation is that the rule does not limit
its mischief to actual recidivists, because it can apply to any unfortunate
person who happens to share his name with another.
Over the years, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has re-
duced the prosecutorial burden of establishing the existence of a prior
conviction to a largely ministerial duty. The evidence deemed adequate
by the court, in many cases, affords only slight indicia of reliability. At
the same time, however, the effort required of the defendant to rebut the
prosecution's prima facie case has risen to a level which cannot fairly be
labeled a burden of production. In effect, though not in name, the de-
fendant must disprove the habitual offender charge by convincing an al-
ready hostile jury that he has not suffered a previous felony conviction.
Regardless of whether one chooses to call it "proof" or "production,"
the shifting burden procedure adopted by the court is troubling in light
of the marginal reliability of the prosecution's evidence. An opportunity
113. The list is replete with examples too numerous to document here. For the disbelievers,
however, note that as of June, 1986 the Department of Corrections maintained active files on: six
persons named "James Alexander," nine persons named "Michael Allen," eight persons named "Bill
Bailey," eight persons named "James Bailey," six persons named "Larry Barnes," five persons
named "James Berry," three persons named "David Blackwell," seven persons named "James
Bowen," twenty-one persons named "James Brown," three persons named "Steven Bruner," four
persons named "David Haijo," three persons named "Ronald Gipson," four persons named "James
Hale," four persons named "David Henderson," four persons named "Charles Henry," four persons
named "Ronald Hicks," seven persons named "Richard Hill," three persons named "Richard Hollo-
way," and three persons named "Willie Houston." Adding common middle initials, note that the
department has active files on: three persons named "Jerry D. Jackson," three persons named "Larry
D. Jackson," six persons named "Billy R. Johnson," six persons named "David L. Johnson," six
persons named "Robert L. Johnson," four persons named "Richard W. King," three persons named
"Robert E. Lee," three persons named "Gary L. McDonald," three persons named "Richard E.
Moore," and three persons named "Jerry D. Powell." This listing of name similarities by no means
exhausts the similarities on the file. The above names were picked out at random after looking at the
file, which contains thousands of names, for no more than twenty minutes.
[Vol. 22:29
28
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 22 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss1/2
1986] PROOF OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS 57
to cross-examine witnesses in the punishment stage of the case, coupled
with a requirement of independent corroboration of identity, would ade-
quately relieve the problem by instating a procedure more likely to
achieve an accurate result which comports with traditional notions of
criminal justice.
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APPENDIX
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKMULGEE COUNTY
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Plaintiff ))
-VS- ) No. CRF)
, Defendant )
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE SUSPENDED
ON PLEA OF GUILTY
Now on this - day of , 19_, the same being a juridi-
cal day of said court, and the time duly appointed for judgment in the
above-entitled cause, and said cause coming on for judgment, and the
defendant being personally present in open court, and being
duly represented at all appearances before this court by h- attorney
of record, , and having been legally charged with the offense
of _ and having been duly informed of the nature of the charge
and having been duly arraigned thereon, and having duly and properly
entered h - plea of guilty to the crime of - after having
been duly advised of h - rights and the effect of such plea; and it
appearing to the court that said defendant is of the age of
years and the defendant having been asked by the court whether h-
has any legal cause to show why judgment and sentence should not be
pronounced against h , and _he stating no sufficient
cause why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced against the
defendant, and none appearing to the court, it is the judgment of the
court that said defendant is guilty of the crime of
It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed by the court that
is sentenced to a term of - years under the
direction and control of the Department of Corrections of the State of
Oklahoma for the crime of and said of sentence to
begin at and from the delivery of the defendant to the Warden of the
State Penitentiary at McAlester, Oklahoma; and that said defendant pay
the cost of this prosecution, taxed at $., for which judgment is
hereby rendered against the defendant; and thereupon the defendant is
by the court notified of h - right of appeal.
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It is further Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed by the court that this
judgment and sentence shall be and is suspended according to the rules
imposed by the court and attached hereto.
District Judge
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